Ukraine at a Crossroads
Introduction
The Orange Revolution in the fall of 2004 built great hopes for a better future for Ukraine, both within its borders and in its relations with other countries. The analogy with the series of peaceful revolutions that took place in Central Europe in 1989, often referred to as the "Autumn of Nations," seemed obvious for many observers. Expectations that Ukraine would follow the path of its more successful post-communist neighbors were high.
Three years after this great event, those hopes have been replaced by disappointment, frustration and confusion. Although progress in the areas of political freedom, pluralism, civil rights and freedom in the media remains unquestionable (although not irreversible -see below) the record of economic, institutional and legal reforms is much more problematic. The key macroeconomic indicators are not better than they were few years ago and the business climate has barely improved. The WTO accession process remains incomplete. Although the perspectives of Euro-Atlantic integration seem slightly better than before, they are continually subject to heated domestic political controversies. In this paper, I argue that the current problems should not be surprising given the previous poor reform record and the persistent difficulties in building a broad political consensus in favor of a systematic pro-market and pro-democratic transition. The Orange Revolution was not the first political window of opportunity which was lost for reforms. The same happened immediately after Ukraine gained independence in 1991-1993, and after the presidential elections in 1994. Even the most reform-oriented cabinet so far, appointed in 1 This relates, in particular, to future NATO membership, which has been questioned by the parties forming a parliamentary majority in the parliament elected in March 2006. 1999 and led by Prime Minister Victor Yushchenko, had a very short political life (only 16 months) and limited political ability to implement crucial reforms.
Why does Ukraine face such major problems in building a stable pro-reform coalition and implementing market-oriented economic reforms in a systematic way (in comparison to other post-communist countries)? The answer to this question would require a complex historical, political and sociological analysis and would need to consider factors such as ethnic, language and regional differences. Unfortunately, taking into account my economic background and experience, this is not a task which I am willing to attempt. Section 4, I analyze the sources of the poor business climate in Ukraine and evaluate policy measures which could help overcome this major obstacle to future rapid growth. To a large extent, the effectiveness of these policies will depend on the reforms of state institutions, including the legislative, executive and judiciary branches of government, as well as administrative reform in local and regional self-governments (Section 5). In Section 6, I will turn to perspectives for Euro-Atlantic integration. The discussion will include the geopolitical aspect, the aspect most frequently and heatedly discussed, but will also touch on other elements which can help to anchor the domestic reform process (particularly in the institutional sphere), which will determine Ukraine's position in the international division of labor for many decades to come. Section 7 will present final conclusions and policy recommendations.
In the paper, I will draw mostly from my own experiences in the area of policy 1. The history of the Ukrainian transition: a comparative perspective
The 'lost decade' of the 1990s
Of all the former communist countries, Ukraine's transition to a market economy has been one of the most difficult and painful. Adaptatitive output decline, an unavoidable phenomenon after the collapse of a command economy, lasted for 10 years in the case of Ukraine (the longest period out of all the transition economies) and amounted to 61.5% (the second largest, after Moldova, among countries not involved in military conflicts -see Dabrowski, 2004b , Table 1 ). The enormous scale of this so-called 'transformation recession' is largely due to the unfavorable starting conditions, i.e. the costs of overcoming Soviet structural distortions and institutional legacy. The exceptional length of output decline was caused by a slow and unsystematic pace of reforms in the 1990s.
The first years of Ukrainian independence under the presidency of Leonid Kravchuk (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) were almost totally lost in terms of market transition. This was in sharp contrast with the rapid economic reforms in the Baltic countries at the same time, which had quite similar starting conditions to those of Ukraine. A lot of political energy was spent on the superficial transformation of the former Soviet institutions into the Ukrainian (national) ones,
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See http://www.case.com.pl/strona-- ID-ukraina,projekt_id-8820735,nlang-710.html; 4 I would like also to thank Paulina Szyrmer for her excellent editorial assistance in preparing this paper.
instead of building and importing the institutions of liberal capitalism from the West, as was done in Central Europe and the Baltic region.
Economic policy was dominated by populism: irresponsible social entitlements, price controls, subsidies and other spending commitments, huge fiscal deficits, multiple exchange rates, netting-out operations (vzaimozachet), crediting loss-making state owned enterprises, and money printing.
As a result, Ukraine suffered hyperinflation at the end of 1993 (see Dabrowski, 1994) .
By December 1993, twelve months of inflation amounted to 10.155%. It was the fourth highest in the post-communist world (see Dabrowski, 2003: 9) . The cumulative inflation during the first five years of transition (December 1991 -December 1996 was one of the highest even among CIS countries (Koen & De Masi, 1997 Georgia.
The fall of 1994 and 1995 (after 1994 Presidential elections ended with the victory of Leonid Kuchma), brought the first more comprehensive attempt to speed up the transition process. This included price liberalization and exchange rate unification, limited trade liberalization, and credit tightening. The authorities also curbed fiscal deficit, introduced a new currency (hryvna), and launched a large scale voucher privatization program. However, the pace of implementation was rather slow and uneven, due to frequent changes in the composition of the government and extensive political bargaining.
When the perspective of economic recovery seemed to be around the corner, Ukraine suffered a serious currency and debt crisis in the second half of 1998 and beginning of 1999, following similar developments in Russia and many other CIS countries. This delayed economic take off by at least one year.
The 1998-1999 crisis proved that the earlier fiscal adjustment was insufficient, and the recently achieved exchange rate and price stability -unsustainable. In fact, the macroeconomic fragility of the second half of the 1990s was deeply rooted in the microeconomic, structural and institutional spheres. Economic recovery was delayed due to slow privatization, soft budget constraints, lack of payment discipline (particularly in an energy sector), tax, budget, wage and pension arrears, widespread barter and netting out operations, using money surrogates, and persistent trade barriers. These phenomena also had a negative impact on fiscal and monetary equilibria. (see Dabrowski et al., 1999) .
Rapid post-recovery catch up in the early 2000s
Finally, the post-adaptation growth recovery came at the end of 1999, almost 8 years later than in Poland, 7 years later than Slovenia, 6 years later than the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Armenia, 5 years later than Estonia, Lithuania, and Georgia, 4 years later than Latvia, Azerbaijan, and Kyrgyzstan, and with a only a half year lag, when compared with Russia (Dabrowski, 2004b) . A unique feature of the Ukrainian recovery was its exceptionally high rate of growth in 2000-2004 (one of the highest in the region). Parallel to the high rate of economic growth, some other key macroeconomic indicators (current account balance, international reserves of the NBU, exchange rate, inflation, fiscal deficit, public debt to GDP ratio) represented either a good or at least an acceptable record (see Table 1) 5 . The high growth rate and positive macroeconomic developments of the early 2000s may be attributed to several factors (see Dabrowski, Jakubiak et al., 2003) . Part of them had
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In preparing the macroeconomic part of my analysis I drew extensively from statistical data, information and opinions provided in the "Ukrainian Economic Outlook," a quarterly publication produced by a team of experts from CASE Ukraine (see http://www.case-ukraine.com.ua/index.php?mode=static_page&pid=10), led by Dmytro Boyarchuk. However, the earlier disclaimer on my sole responsibility for the content and quality of this paper also applies to this particular component. a temporary (windfall) character and were generated by factors such as import substitution and real depreciation of a significant part of the budget expenditure commitments as a result of the 1998-1999 hryvna devaluation. Other windfall factors such as high international prices of metallurgy products (see Figure 1) , and indirectly -through Russia's import demand -high international oil prices, persisted over the entire period analyzed.
Beyond the windfall factors, the Ukrainian economy began to benefit, at last, from the reform efforts undertaken in the second half of 1990s, particularly from the privatization of the manufacturing industry, trade and service sectors, and agriculture (though the latter was privatized with a significant delay and has numerous remaining barriers). On the top of this, Finally, in 2004, Ukraine launched a Russian-type reform of the personal income tax (with single tax rate of 13%), which created the opportunity to make the tax system more business-friendly and limit incentives to move to a shadow economy. However the remaining elements of the tax system and the entire system of tax administration remained hostile to business activity and continued to be perceived as one of the major sources of corruption and poor investment climate (Golodniuk et al., 2005) .
In 2004, the year of the presidential elections, the rate of GDP growth (12.1%) reached its highest historical level in independent Ukraine, due to very favorable external factors and at the cost of deteriorating domestic macroeconomic equilibria. The high international demand and high prices for metallurgical products were additionally supported by an exchange rate policy conducted by the NBU: pegging the hryvna to the USD meant its nominal depreciation to other currencies at that time. In Ukraine the notion of "reprivatization" is used rather than "renationalization". The former implies that renationalized property will be privatized again soon (as really happened in the case of Krivorozhstal). However, outside Ukraine, "reprivatization" usually has a different meaning -the restitution of private ownership in relation to property nationalized by communist regimes in the past. To avoid confusion, I will use the term "renationalization" as it better reflects the essence of the analyzed phenomenon -reversing the previous privatization transaction by the state (regardless of the subsequent steps in respect to the seized property). Table 8 .1, p.
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I.e. Krivorozhstal, the Insurance Company "Oranta" and the Nikopol Ferroalloy Plant (unfinished case) -see Paskhaver & Verkhovodova (2006) .
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The low level of professionalism, widespread corruption and systemic chaos in the judiciary further undermined the stability of property rights. 15). Increasing tax discipline and eliminating numerous tax distortions (meaning a more equal treatment of various categories of taxpayers) should be considered a great policy success. On the other hand, additional revenues have been immediately spent on wage and pension increases and other social programs instead of decreasing general tax rates or eliminating the most distortive taxes. The major expansion of social transfers (see Table 2 
Medium and Long-Term Macroeconomic Challenges
A superficial analysis of key macroeconomic indicators (see Table 1 ) may suggest that Ukraine will not face serious macroeconomic tensions in the near future. However, such an opinion would be wrong. The period of post-adaptation output recovery associated with the fast remonetization of the economy and the high pace of budget revenue increase seems to be over. Fundamental inconsistencies in the actual monetary/exchange rate regime, which systematically cumulated during the past seven years, will become even more harmful with the increasing financial and investment openness of the Ukrainian economy. Modest fiscal imbalances will also become more acute if economic growth decelerates at some point 11 and
as result of unfavorable demographic trends. These challenges need an adequate and timely response if Ukraine wants to avoid more serious macroeconomic tensions in the future.
Looking for a more consistent monetary regime
As mentioned earlier, Ukraine has had problems in bringing inflation to a sustainable low one-digit level. This seems to be closely linked to the fundamental problems and inconsistencies experienced by monetary policy. If one looks into money supply statistics, one will find a very high growth rate of monetary aggregates through the entire post-1998- Referring to an analytical framework frequently used in more developed market economies one can argue that the "cyclically adjusted" fiscal deficit has been higher than the actual one. While the question of whether Ukraine' economy has already experienced a regular business cycle is highly debatable, there is little doubt that high growth rates in 2000-2004 and 2006-2007 One can argue that a fixed exchange rate provides an automatic mechanism which adjusts the money supply to money demand through a balance-of-payments channel and it should sooner or later bring a far-reaching inflation convergence with an anchor currency area 16 . This is true in the case of stable and credible pegs, mostly the so-called "hard pegs", i.e. currency boards or adopting either a common currency or other country's currency. Under a fixed exchange rate regime inflation differences can originate from: (i) initial under-or overvaluation of fixed exchange rate, i.e. PPP differences in respect to tradables; (ii) Balassa-Samuelson effect; (iii) changes in exchange rates between major currencies if a country's foreign trade transactions are denominated in various currencies.
Ukraine's soft peg is far from this model because (i) the exchange rate can be formally changed at any time; (ii) NBU continues operations on its domestic assets.
The current monetary/ exchange rate regime belongs to the broad category of intermediate (hybrid) regimes, which seem to be incompatible with mostly unrestricted capital mobility. Its first flaw is that hybrid regimes are unlikely to provide the same advantages as pure ones, i.e. neither an exchange rate anchor nor sufficient discretion in managing domestic liquidity. Second, compromised regimes are technically very difficult to manage because of fluctuating demand for money and changing market expectations. Moreover, political pressure may cause temptation to go beyond the compromise. Third, the transparency, and, therefore, the credibility of intermediate regimes is lower than that of the 'corner' solutions. This last weakness has been evident in financial crises of the 1990s (see Dabrowski, 2001 for general discussion; Jakubiak et al., 2005 in respect to Ukraine).
As a result, hybrid regimes may provoke a speculative attack against the hryvna at the time of serious macroeconomic or political turbulences. The afore-mentioned episodes of political instability and speculative pressure on the foreign exchange market (for example, at the end of 2004) provide clear evidence that this is not a purely hypothetical threat.
Thus, Ukraine should depart from the current hybrid regime towards one of the 'corner' solutions as fast as it can by either choosing a sovereign monetary policy with a free float or adopting a 'hard' peg (see Frankel, 1999; Mundell, 1999; Krugman, 1999; Eichengreen, 1999) . The IMF (2005a, pp. 21-22) supports the first option and recommends moving to direct inflation targeting (DIT) and a flexible exchange rate. This regime has been tried in recent decade in a number of transition and developing countries (including the Czech Republic and Poland) and has brought satisfactory disinflation results.
However, adopting DIT requires a lot of preparatory steps (see IMF, 2005a, Box 2, p. 22) such as implementing legal and institutional changes (a higher degree of NBU independence from both executive and legislative branches of government), developing and deepening the money and foreign exchange market, liberalizing capital accounts, moving to a free floating exchange rate, making radical changes in the monetary policy operational framework and instruments, developing statistical, analytical and forecasting capacities of the NBU and independent analytical centres. Some of these steps, like making the exchange rate flexible, may prove politically difficult to carry out. All of them will take time: approximately 2-3 years from the beginning of implementation to complete adoption (see Dabrowski, 2006) . The opposite 'corner' solution, i.e. a 'hard' peg seems to be technically easier to adopt as it would continue using the existing exchange rate anchor. However, its adoption would require, however, abandoning any discretionary monetary policy operations (in fact, giving up sovereign monetary policy and any active role for the NBU in this sphere) and fixing the exchange rate forever. This should involve a serious discussion on the choice of an anchor currency; while the US dollar is the dominant currency of global financial transactions and investment decisions, as well as savings and trade with CIS and developing countries, the importance of the Euro will increase after Ukraine's deeper trade and economic integration with the EU.
Both 'corner' solutions have their advantages and disadvantages (see Dabrowski, 2004 ) which must be balanced and analyzed carefully before making a definite regime choice decision.
Fiscal policy dilemmas
Fiscal expansion constituted another important source of inflationary pressure. Until 2003, the Ukrainian budget was relatively balanced with the deficit not exceeding 1.5% of GDP (see Table 1 As a result, Ukraine has already joined the group of high-spending countries of Western and Central Europe, disregarding its much lower level of income per capita, when compared to those countries. This will not help in sustaining a high rate of economic growth as higher expenditures must mean higher taxes sooner or later (see below). This, in turn, will decrease the rate of private saving and investment, push business activity to the "shadow" zone, and decrease labor market participation (see Rohozynsky, 2007) .
The level of public debt is not very high by international standards and is continuously diminishing in relation to GDP from its peak level in 1999, i.e. immediately after the currency 17 Acceleration of economic growth also contributed to a rapid increase in revenue in 2006. crisis and near-default (see Figure 2) . The government can borrow relatively cheaply on both domestic and international financial markets. However, this quite comfortable picture will not necessarily last forever. First, the early 2000s were marked by extraordinary low interest rates and financial calm on international markets. At least the first part of this characteristic seems to be definitely over: interest rates are systematically going up. Second and more important, apart from official public debt, Ukraine accumulated the substantial implicit debt of the PAYG pension system (unfunded pension liabilities), which will further increase due to unfavorable demographic trends in the next several decades. The recent expansion of social spending additionally complicates this picture because once granted, social entitlements cannot easily be withdrawn in bad fiscal times. Third, contingent liabilities in the financial sector constitute another form of the implicit public debt. They originated mostly from the political commitment to compensate Ukrainian citizens' heavy loses in the real value of their saving deposits due to hyperinflation in the first years of independence. Although the amount of these liabilities is not precisely determined and is not indexed against the current inflation it still remains at levels well exceeding the official public debt (see Figure 2 and IMF, 2007a, Box 2, p. 17). Furthermore, as this issue continues to be the subject of heated political debate, especially during the subsequent elections one cannot estimate the ultimate fiscal consequences and timetable of its resolution. (Margalyk, 2005) has been: Cut tax rates and get almost immediately higher tax revenue because of "de-shadowing" of informal economy
It is worth remembering that the original Laffer curve idea (Laffer, 2004 ) represented a rather supply-side concept: increased output and employment as a result of a lower tax burden. However, in the specific context of transition economy, one can expect an additional effect: the "de-shadowing" of the economy due to lower tax rates, which can bring additional revenue gains (see Walewski, 2001) . The "optimists" in a tax reduction debate clearly expect that such a "de-shadowing" would immediately overcompensate loses caused by the reduction of tax rates in the case of an economy with a large unregistered sector like Ukraine. "Skeptics" or "realists" call for a realistic estimation of the positive effect in terms of its expected size and time lag. First, in the case of particular tax one must know at which concrete point of a Laffer curve the Ukrainian economy is at now. This may be not so easy to assess with a wide margin of uncertainty in respect to possible fiscal consequences. Second, taxpayers' reaction will depend not only on the reduction of tax rates but also on many other accompanying measures and factors such as quality of tax administration, expected stability of the new rates and rules, deregulation of business activity, protection of property rights, political stability and predictability, etc. Third, no positive reaction can be expected to happen overnight.
Calls for deep unilateral tax cuts became particularly strong during subsequent election campaigns and in the period of political radicalization following the Orange Revolution. On the other hand, a sharp increase in the level of fiscal redistribution of GDP during and after the Orange Revolution has dramatically narrowed the room for maneuver for any tax reform. A country which redistributes more than 40% of its GDP through its budget and off-budgetary funds, cannot have low and non-distorting taxation, unless the level of public expenditures is substantially reduced.
The additional constraint comes from the structure of public expenditures. As almost half of them are directed towards various forms of social programs and social transfers (see Table 2 ) this limits the room for reduction of high payroll taxes, which are so direly needed from the point of view of "de-shadowing" the informal sector and labor relations. The Pension Fund already runs a deficit of around 5% of GDP and cutting the Pension Fund contribution rate without a reduction of pension entitlements would mean a further increase in budget transfers financed from other sources. Hypothetically, such a transfer could be financed from VAT but (i) the VAT rate is already high (20%) and cannot be further increased; (ii) such a maneuver would further weaken the link between pension contributions and future benefits and the chance to build an insurance or quasi-insurance type of pension system.
Without an expenditure reduction, only minor changes in tax rates are possible. First, a further elimination of remaining tax exemptions, of which there are not many (in terms of their value) might allow for some decrease in basic tax rates (enterprise profit tax in the first instance). Second, one can consider moving the tax burden between various taxes, i.e. decreasing the rate of some existing taxes at the expense of increasing others or creating new taxes. While some moves of this kind seem to be possible and justified, one must be extremely careful in estimating their immediate fiscal effects. For example, the introduction of a real estate tax, which would finance local budgets, could create some room for lowering other taxes. However, this kind of reform requires a lot of time and effort before the new tax will become operational.
Some proposals of the tax reform neglect the external institutional constraints such as the consequences of the expected WTO accession or the country's ambitions to advance its economic integration with the EU. If Ukraine wants to become deeply integrated into a global and European economy and improve its business climate for foreign investors it must make its tax system compatible with the European ones. This means the ideas to replace VAT with a turnover or sales tax advocated by some Ukrainian politicians and lobbyists during subsequent election campaigns will go exactly in the opposite direction (besides the many other serious flaws of this proposal).
Apart from a fiscal adjustment based on expenditure reduction, Ukraine needs a further strengthening of fiscal management rules, which would help to avoid continuation of fiscal imbalances and further build up of explicit and implicit public debt. On the other hand, it would provide more transparency in fiscal accounts and an institutional framework for increasing effectiveness and improving targeting of public expenditure. This set of measures can include:
• legal limits on the size of the deficit (or the zero-deficit principle) and public debt (in nominal terms or in relation to GDP);
• a legal obligation to estimate the fiscal consequences of new legislation by an independent accounting (actuarial) office/ agency; this kind of provision is particularly important in case of social and tax legislation;
• strengthening formal prerogatives of the Minister of Finance inside the government and the Budget Committee inside the parliament;
• the exclusive right of government to propose legislation initiatives, which bring serious fiscal consequences (or the right of government to veto such initiatives of MPs);
• mandatory medium-term fiscal planning (especially in respect to public investment projects and social programs)
• full harmonization of the fiscal classification and reporting rules with the international standards Depending on the nature of the concrete measure, the proposed fiscal rules require legislative changes (including changes in the Constitution), executive orders, internal parliamentary regulations or informal political consensus between political parties.
Social policy reform
A complex social reform should aim at achieving the following goals: (i) decreasing total social expenditures in relation to GDP; (ii) better targeting of various social welfare programs, which should provide support to the most vulnerable groups in the population; (iii) diminishing the negative microeconomic and social side-effects of welfare programs, mostly related to dependency culture, shadow economy and the de-activation of the labor force.
Among various social welfare schemes, the publicly financed PAYG system plays the most important role. It has one of the highest levels of current expenditures in the world (see Figure 3 ) and an enormous size of long-term financial liabilities. The excessive liabilities of the pension system can be reduced by either decreasing the replacement rate (i.e. relation between the average pension and the average wage) or the dependency ratio (i.e. relation between the number of people receiving pension benefits and those contributing to the system). So far, unavoidable adjustments occurred spontaneously mainly through the first channel, i.e. either through inflationary depreciation of only partly and irregularly indexed pension benefits or through slower growth of real pensions when compared to real wages and salaries
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. However, this approach seems to represent serious flaws in the area of social fairness.
First, correcting the Pension Fund imbalances through decreasing the replacement rate means decreasing the relative purchasing power of the average pension, when compared to the average wage and salary, which if goes too far, could mean increasing the poverty vulnerability of pensioners. This would also inevitably cause the flattening of the structure of individual pension benefits (assuming that some minimal, socially justified, size of pension benefit must exist). This, in turn, would decrease incentives to comply with payroll tax rules among middle-and higher-income groups of population.
Second and more important, partial and irregular indexation often leads to faster real depreciation of the earlier granted benefits compared to those newly granted. In practical terms, this means that older pensioners (representing the "old pension portfolio" and having limited or no ability to earn additional money) become disadvantaged when compared to "newcomers", many of whom can continue work officially or unofficially.
Taking into consideration the above arguments and the rapidly aging population structure of Ukrainian society (which represents one of the most dramatic national demographic scenarios in Europe) one should think, first and foremost, about improving the dependency ratio (or at least stopping its deterioration). This could be done through the increase of both the official and effective retirement ages (the latter is much lower than the official due to the existence of various early retirement privileges), which would decrease the number of pensioners and increase the number of contributors to the Pension Fund, other things being equal. Another measure of similar character should aim at tightening eligibility criteria for receiving disability pensions, which could reduce the record-high number of disability pensioners in Ukraine.
Although not politically easy to implement, the proposed measures (like any kind of serious social policy adjustment) would mean a better targeting of social benefits (pensions in this particular case) to the most vulnerable groups in the population (the truly old and actual invalids) at the expense of the "shadow" zone, of relatively young pensioners, which can and do continue working, as well as people who abuse the disability pension system. The measures could also help to stop or limit the otherwise unavoidable tendency to decrease the replacement rate (see above). Indirectly, they would also decrease incentives to take up informal employment practices and help to eliminate various kinds of distortions on the Ukrainian labor market. 
How can the business climate be improved?
Although is was overcome the following year, the economic slowdown of 2005 (see Section 2.3) served as the warning signal that the high pace of economic growth observed between 2000 and 2004 was not guaranteed forever. Apart from windfall factors (high world prices for metallurgy products), the rapid growth at this period could be attributed, to a
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Such an approach has been also assumed by Rohozynsky (2007) who analyzes various macroeconomic scenarios of adjusting social expenditures in the forthcoming years.
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International experience demonstrates the failure of these kinds of incentives to increase fertility rates. Looking at the potential strategies aimed at improving business and investment climate, one must remember that the room for maneuver for quick fixes is limited due to the fundamental flaws of many basic state institutions such as public administration or judiciary (see Section 5). For example, the judicial control of administrative decisions, which constitutes the basic protection mechanism of business freedom in developed countries, is not available to Ukrainian entrepreneurs because of the very poor performance of the Ukrainian court system and -more generally -a lack of respect for the rule of law. This bottleneck only can be partly substituted by the monitoring provided by civil society organizations and by the special administrative agency, which plays the role of "entrepreneur ombudsman", i.e. the State Committee of Ukraine for Regulatory Policy and Entrepreneurship.
The above circumstances mean that more sophisticated regulatory solutions copied from the developed countries might not necessarily work well in Ukraine, at least in the near future. Instead, they call for simple and radical deregulation measures such as abandoning some non-priority areas of regulations and closing down or substantially downsizing institutions in charge of these regulations (to avoid bureaucratic attempts of reversing deregulation). This approach was successfully adopted in Georgia after the Rose Revolution in 2003 (see Lessons, 2006) .
The regular verification of all existing regulations where ministries and agencies must justify prolongation of each single executive order (the so-called "Guillotine" principle adopted, among others, in Moldova in early 2000s) in another good measure protecting economic freedom. Finally, widespread application of online e-procedures (in business registration and licensing, applying for administrative permissions, tax and custom reporting and settlements, public procurement, etc.) could make compliance with various administrative procedures more transparent, less expensive and less time-consuming for both public administration workers and business people.
Reforming a post-Soviet state
As mentioned previously the poor business climate in Ukraine has its roots in the unreformed post-Soviet state which continues to perform several functions typical for a command economy and non-democratic political regime. As in the Soviet or even pre-Soviet era, the Ukrainian state apparatus still tries to interfere in the details of business activity and the day-to-day life of its citizens while it is unable to provide them with basic public goods such as law and order, security, judiciary, equal and fair treatment of all citizens and firms, basic technical and social infrastructure, etc. This kind of bureaucratic patrimonialism creates a fertile ground for corruption (see Dubrovskiy, 2006) , which is widely considered the number one social and economic disease in Ukraine. 
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In the scale of 0-10 where 0 means highly corrupt and 10 -highly clean country -see http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi /2006 In addition, due to slow privatization, many enterprises remain state-owned and are thus easy targets of rent seeking and rent extraction, and create development bottlenecks in some important infrastructure sectors, such as telecommunication, energy production and distribution and transportation.
The weakness of state institutions is caused, among others, by insufficient democratization, weak civil society, an unstable and immature system of political parties (penetrated by powerful business elites representing their interests), and an inefficient and corrupted judiciary. In spite of major political improvement after the Orange Revolution, Ukraine still lags, in many respects, behind not only mature Western democracies but also the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, which recently joined the EU.
According to the Freedom House "Freedom in the World" 2007 annual report, 22 Ukraine belongs to the group of "free" countries 23 but its scores (3 for political rights and 2 for civil rights) lag behind the EU standard of 1 for both categories, which all countries meet apart from Bulgaria and Romania. However, the regional "Nations in Transit" ranking run by the same institution and covering a wider set of indicators reveals some important vulnerabilities of the young Ukrainian democracy. As shown in Table 3 , Ukraine's performance in four specific areas -"Judicial Framework and Independence", "National
Democratic Governance", "Local Democratic Governance" and "Corruption" -continues to be disappointing and shows little or no improvement compared to the early 2000s. Apart from further constitutional changes, the modernization of the Ukrainian state requires several other institutional reforms such as:
A complex administrative reform in order to improve the efficiency of government agencies and to focus them on providing basic public goods and services that cannot be supplied by the market mechanism. To achieve this, the government and public administration structure must be simplified, redundant and unnecessary functions eliminated, the number of personnel reduced, and the resulting budget savings used to increase the salaries of the remaining civil servants.
ii. The administrative reform must be supplemented by the consequent building of the professional, stable and apolitical civil service corps on the central, regional and local Because such complex institutional changes require a lot of time to be implemented and bring substantial improvement, implementation should begin as soon as possible, drawing on foreign expertise and technical assistance.
An independent judicial system must include regular courts, magistrate courts, and specialized judicial and quasi-judicial bodies, with clearly defined legal mandates
24
. Both prosecutors and judges should enjoy independent status (lifetime nominations after scrupulous selection and examination of candidates), be accountable only to the law and code of professional ethics, and much better trained and remunerated (to resist corruption temptation).
The challenge of globalization and economic integration
Another potential obstacle to the future economic growth of Ukraine is connected with its insufficient trade and economic relations with developed countries, particularly with the enlarged European Union. As demonstrated in Table 4 , the geographic structure of Ukraine's trade changed very little in the first half of the 2000s. In fact, the share of total exports to EU and EU candidates (Turkey playing the most prominent role among the latter) decreased over the analyzed period. Russia and other CIS and developing countries remain the main destinations of Ukrainian export.
Export geography is closely linked with its commodity structure (see Table 5 ); lowprocessed ferrous and non-ferrous metals, chemicals, food and other raw-materials continue to represent almost two-thirds of the total. If we add the technically outdated products of the machine building industry and fuel and energy products (part of which are re-exported after being produced in other CIS countries), we get a picture of the weak international competitiveness of the Ukrainian economy and its continues dependence on intra-CIS markets. Most of the export products have a limited chance to be sold in developed countries. They can still be exported to CIS and some developing countries but this window of opportunity will not last indefinitely, especially when taking into consideration the
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In the last couple of years, one could observe such legal paradoxes such as a ruling on the legality of a Presidential decree by an ordinary district court instead of the Constitutional Court.
increasing openness of developing countries and increasing trade competition on world markets.
More changes have been observed on the import side in the analyzed period, with the share of fuel and energy products from CIS slowly diminishing, and the share of machinery from the EU slowly increasing (see Tables 4 and 5 ). Nevertheless, the import structure (in terms of geography and commodity composition) also looks different from most of the EU new member states and EU candidates in South Eastern Europe (SEE). SEE countries trade mostly with the EU and manufacturing products (including intra-industry trade) prevail in their trade flows. The continuous high energy-intensiveness (one of the highest in the world), especially in export-oriented industries such as metallurgy and chemical products, makes the Ukrainian economy strongly dependent on oil and gas import from Russia, and vulnerable to changes in oil and gas prices. Furthermore, the EU did not offer CIS countries the opportunity to negotiate and sign free trade agreements (FTA) prior to, or in parallel with, their WTO accession. The official EU policy was: WTO accession first and only afterwards can free trade feasibility studies and negotiations begin. This was a major difference compared to the attitude adopted towards EU candidates -some of them were allowed to sign a comprehensive FTA agreement with the EU parallell to, or even before formally completing the WTO accession process.
Excluded from the global and European trade liberalization processes, CIS countries made several, largely unsuccessful attempts to build their own regional trade block. The CIS itself, had, among other goals (such as being the mechanism for the peaceful political dissolution of the former Soviet Union) the goal to forming a kind of post-Soviet common market. However, the subsequent multilateral and bilateral free trade agreements between 25 CASE ENEPO WP1 database based on the Penn World Table 6 .1 (PWT 6.1), http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt62/pwt62_form.php CIS countries were never fully implemented. The same concerned the more ambitious integration projects like the Single Economic Space between Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine (which has the Russian acronym EEP). Their failure was caused by a number of political, economic and institutional reasons: lack of political trust between partners, asymmetry of the countries' economic and political potentials, a divergence of national economic interests, the varied pace of economic reforms, the lack of effective enforcement and arbitrage mechanisms and others. Although intra-CIS regional trade liberalization does work to limited extent, it helps very little in restructuring and modernizing CIS economies, because all the partners have development problems. In this respect CIS trade liberalization mechanisms, although important for the Ukrainian economy, cannot be considered a substitute for global or European trade and economic integration. , the EU offers its neighbors "…a privileged relationship, building upon a mutual commitment to common values (democracy and human rights, rule of law, good governance, market economy principles and sustainable development). The ENP goes beyond existing relationships to offer a deeper political relationship and economic integration.
The level of ambition of the relationship will depend on the extent to which these values are effectively shared." Originally this general declaration was followed by a clear statement that the ENP is not about the next EU enlargement and does not offer an EU accession perspective. Recently it was replaced by a more flexible approach: "The ENP remains distinct from the process of enlargement although it does not prejudge, for European neighbors, how their relationship with the EU may develop in future, in accordance with Treaty provisions." The door has been hypothetically opened for European CIS countries such as Ukraine. However, this seems to portray a very distant and unclear perspective, 
Conclusions
Sixteen years after obtaining independence and three years after the Orange Revolution, Ukraine has reached a crossroads. It has broken with the Soviet and totalitarian past but its democracy is still relatively young and fragile, and therefore vulnerable to various political shocks. Basic civil and economic freedoms are not well protected due to numerous legal and institutional imperfections, most notably a poorly performing judiciary. Ukraine has succeeded in building the basic institutional foundations of a market economy. However, its capitalism is heavily distorted and its economic transition is far from complete. The economic landscape is dominated by large financial-industrial groups, the so called 'oligarchs,' whose short term interests override the interests of SME owners, foreign investors and consumers thanks to non-transparent political mechanisms. After ten years of transformation output decline, the economy is growing at a relatively high pace, but the long-term sustainability of this growth will depend on an improvement in investment climate. In geopolitical terms, Ukraine did not make its final choice yet -whether it is going to participate seriously in the Euro-Atlantic integration or remain in the 'grey zone' of the European periphery. Even making a firm political commitment in favor of the first choice does not guarantee that it will be given the chance to materialize quickly. For many reasons, Ukraine's road to EU and NATO membership will be more difficult than that of countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The
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This anti-enlargement sentiment works particularly strongly against the EU membership aspirations of Turkey, for historical and cultural reasons. However, one can expect a similar reaction in respect to the hypothetical EU membership aspirations of Ukraine. external incentives for Ukraine are much weaker than those enjoyed by those countries which joined the EU in 2004 and 2007. Similarly to other CIS countries, Ukraine urgently needs a new round of reforms which would primarily address the institutional and structural weaknesses. Compared to the earlier stage of economic transition, Ukrainian policymakers must go well beyond the purely economic agenda and also address issues of legal, administrative and political reforms.
These are absolutely critical to create a healthy business environment and integrate Ukraine with the world and European economy. Failure to design, launch and implement such reforms can undermine prospects of economic growth in both the medium and long term perspective as well as the chances to speed up the modernization processes.
The politics and political economy dimensions of taking the strategic decisions outlined above will not be easy. The country is deeply divided in political, cultural, regional and ethnic terms. There is little chance that a clear winner will emerge from the September 2007 parliamentary elections. Thus, forming a stable government with coherent and consistent program will not be an easy task. The political struggle will probably continue at least until the 2009 presidential election. In such an environment, crucial reforms and strategic decisions -whether subsequent constitutional reform, major institutional changes or Ukraine's relations with the EU and NATO -will require a wider cross-party political consensus.
